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Abstract:  This paper examines the problem of optimal tax mix analytically in a two-sector growth model 
with transitional dynamics.  Tax revenue is required to provide a pure public good.  The key problems 
are: over-consumption of leisure under labor income or c onsumption taxes; and under-investments in 
human and physical capital under income taxes.  Without investment subsidies, consumption taxes do 
better than uniform income taxes, but can be improved on locally via positive taxation of physical capital 
income and a negative tax on labor income. With subsidies the first best can be achieved in a system  
where: (i) if consumption and labor income taxes are non-zero they are of the same rate but opposite 
signs, (ii) the tax rate on physical capital income exceeds  that on labor income, (iii) subsidy rates on 
investments equal income tax rates, for both forms of capital.  In any given circumstances, a range of 
alternative tax mixes may provide equivalent results.  This result, combined with practical constraints, 
may help to explain the variety of tax mixes observed across countries. 
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Recent literature has incorporated endogenous human capital in perfect foresight dynamic optimal
tax analyses. (See e.g. Bull, 1993, and Jones et al., 1993, 97.) This literature has extended the
zero long-run capital income tax results of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), obtained with only
physical capital, to show that in the steady state optimal tax rates on human as well as physical
capital income, and on consumption, are zero (e.g., Jones et al., 1993, 97). The optimal program
calls for taxes to be high in the short-run, with a large surplus being built up that can be used to
ﬁnance government expenditure in the long-run as tax rates go to zero.
While the insights of the dynamic optimal tax literature have been path-breaking, tax rates
falling toward zero in the long-run are in sharp contrast to what we observe. In the real world tax
systems show more stability over time. Recent papers in the optimal tax literature have provided
a variety of reasons why taxes should not disappear in the long-run.1 Attention is thus turning to
the optimal design of more stable tax systems. In order to establish a benchmark in this area we
think it is useful to ask what the optimal design of taxes would be if governments were limited to
the choice of stationary tax rates. That is the task we set ourselves in this paper.
While it is arbitrary to limit the choice of tax regimes to stationary ones, it is important to
note that all of the dynamic optimal tax discussion relies on arbitrary assumptions. The literature
assumes that governments can commit to a future trajectory of taxes, sidestepping the time incon-
sistency problem; that lump sum taxes (e.g. an initial capital levy) are not available; and that tax
rates lie within certain bounds. In this context, investigating the implications of constant tax rates
is a natural additional path to explore.
There is a signiﬁcant amount of previous literature that, rather than solving the optimal con-
stant tax structure problem, has asked computationally which of certain alternative stationary tax
regimes is superior for welfare or growth. (See e.g. Summers, 1981; Auerbach, and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987;
1Jones et al. (1993, 97) identify upper limits on tax rates, revenue constraints, pure proﬁts arising from productive
government spending, or inclusion of capital in the social planner’s (not households’) preferences as reasons for taxes
to persist in the long run. Aiyagari (1995) shows that incomplete markets and borrowing constraints can produce the
same result. Judd (1997), and Guo and Lansing (1999) ﬁnd that imperfect competition may even motivate negative
capital income taxes that persist in the long run.
1and Pecorino, 1993, 94.) The answer is that consumption taxes usually dominate either wage taxes
or uniform income taxes. In this paper we ask whether, when the range of choice is widened, it will
still be best to rely wholly on a consumption tax, or whether a mix of taxes would be better. This
question has empirical relevance since most countries depend on a rich mix of taxes rather than on
a narrow revenue source.2
This paper investigates the optimal stationary tax mix in an endogenous growth model with both
physical and human capital and endogenous leisure. In this model, the government may employ a
full range of alternative tax instruments to ﬁnance public consumption, and it may also subsidize
investments.3 A novel feature of this paper is that we are able to derive, analytically, optimal tax
schemes that apply not only in the steady state but also in transition. This transparency results
from simple assumptions on preferences and technology. We assume log utility, a Cobb-Douglas
production function, and full depreciation of all capital in one period. While these assumptions
clearly limit the generality of our results, they allow a full characterization of the dynamic path
of the two-sector growth model and an explicit representation of the welfare function. They also
allow us to handle readily investment subsidies for both physical and human capital. The results
provide a number of insights that would not emerge so strongly from less simple models.
In agreement with previous work, in a world without human or physical investment subsidies,
our model shows that a pure consumption tax is superior to a uniform income tax, both in welfare
terms and also in terms of growth rates. However, if the uniformity of income taxes is relaxed,
one can do better. Welfare and growth can be improved if, starting from a pure consumption tax,
one levies a tax on capital income and a subsidy on labor income. This might seem to be rather
academic, since in the real world we observe substantial positive tax rates on labor. However,
we show that if investment subsidies are introduced a system that dominates a consumption tax,
2This fact is reﬂected in our Table 4. See also Mendoza et al. (1994, Tables 1-3), or Krusell et al. (1996, Table 1).
3In the standard Ramsey framework, tax revenues are used for lump-sum transfers to individuals. In practice,
however, a large proportion of tax revenue is used to provide public goods and services in many countries. According
to the Barro-Wolf data set in Barro (1991), most of the OECD countries spend more government revenue on the
provision of goods and services than transfers net of social security. Due to this fact, we focus on the extreme case
where there are no lump-sum transfers in the main analysis but we will discuss in Section 3 (and Appendix J) whether
our main results hold in the case where the tax revenue, net of subsidies, is used for lump-sum transfers only.
2without unrealistic tax rates, can be designed.
In a world with exogenous human capital it is well known that a pure consumption tax is
equivalent to a Hall-Rabushka tax, that is a tax on labor and business income that allows immediate
expensing of capital. When human capital is endogenous, the equivalence continues to hold as long
as full costs of human capital investment are also immediately deductible. We refer to such a scheme,
which subsidizes investment at the same rate it taxes income, as a “modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax”.
Since it is possible to improve on a pure consumption tax it is of course also possible to improve
on the modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme. This is done by increasing the tax rate on capital and
reducing it on labor income, but keeping the investment subsidy rates unchanged. In the resulting
system physical capital is taxed more heavily than labor; costs of physical investment are not fully
deductible against capital income taxes; and human capital investment is subsidized at a higher
rate than labor income is taxed. If we keep in mind the substantial subsidies to human capital
investment that are delivered outside the tax system, this package is remarkably similar to what is
observed in the United States and a number of other countries.
When investment subsidies are allowed it is not only possible to improve on consumption taxes,
but the ﬁrst-best can also be achieved. There is a continuum of ﬁrst-best schemes, with the following
characteristics: (i) if consumption and labor income taxes are non-zero they are of the same rate
but opposite signs, (ii) the tax rate on physical capital income exceeds that on labor income, (iii)
subsidy rates on investments equal income tax rates, for both forms of capital. In such schemes the
eﬀects of consumption and labor income taxes on labor-leisure choice cancel out, and intertemporal
distortions are avoided by subsidizing the costs of investment at the same rate at which beneﬁts
are taxed (as is also the case in the modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme).
While the real world certainly exhibits subsidies on investments, and cases where eﬀective tax
rates on particular forms of consumption or income are negative, generally tax rates are positive.
We interpret this as resulting from forces outside the model, such as the need to combat evasion
and avoidance. Thus, while the ﬁrst-best results are instructive they are not a practical guide to
policy. We argue that when real-world constraints on tax and subsidy rates are taken into account
3the best system that can be achieved may be one that starts from a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme
and adjusts capital and labor income tax rates upward and downward respectively, as described
above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives
the main results. The rankings of diﬀerent tax schemes in terms of growth and welfare are given
in Section 3. Application of the results to the interpretation of real-world tax systems is discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks. Unless provided in the text, proofs are
relegated to the appendices.
2. The basic model and results
Our model has an inﬁnite number of periods (t = 0;1;2;:::) and a constant population with measure
one. Agents are identical and inﬁnitely lived. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time per
period, which is allocated among leisure Zt, production Lt, and education St. There are a publicly
provided consumption good, and a private good that can be consumed, invested in human capital
through education, or used to form new physical capital through a one-for-one conversion.
The representative agent’s preferences are deﬁned over private consumption Ct, leisure Zt, and




t(lnCt + ilnZt +  lnGt);  > 0; 0 <  < 1; i = 0;1; (1)
where  measures the taste for public consumption,  is the subjective discount factor, and i
indicates whether leisure is elastic. If i = 0 leisure is inelastic while if i > 0 leisure is elastic;
both treatments of leisure are seen in the literature on optimal taxation. For notational simplicity,
positive values of i are normalized to unity.4 We view elastic leisure as a general case so that when
we do not specify otherwise leisure is elastic.
The private good is produced according to:
Yt = AK
t(HtLt)1; A > 0; 0 <  < 1; (2)
4The essence of the results is unaﬀected if i takes other positive values.
4where Yt is output, A a productivity parameter, Kt physical capital, Lt labor, Ht human capital
(skill), and  the share parameter that measures the importance of physical capital relative to
eﬀective labor.
Human capital or skills accumulate through education:
Ht+1 = AHQ
t (StHt)1 + (1  H)Ht; AH > 0; 0 <  < 1; 0  H  1; (3)
where Qt is the private investment of goods in education, St the time input in learning, AH a
productivity parameter, H the rate of human capital depreciation, and  the share parameter
that measures the importance of physical inputs relative to the eﬀective units of time inputs. This
two-sector growth model with production and education is similar to that in Lucas (1988).
2.1. Competitive equilibrium
We assume that government expenditures on public consumption Gt are funded by ﬂat-rate
taxes. The tax instruments we consider include a consumption tax (at a rate ct), a labor (human
capital) income tax (lt), a physical capital income tax (kt), an education subsidy (sqt), and a
physical capital investment subsidy or investment tax credit (skt). An individual’s budget and
time constraints are given by:
(1 + ct)Ct = (1  lt)wtHtLt + (1  kt)rtKt  (1  sqt)Qt 
(1  skt)[Kt+1  (1  K)Kt]; (4)
Zt = 1  Lt  St; (5)
where wt and rt are, respectively, the wage rate and physical capital rental rate, and K 2 [0;1] is
the rate of physical capital depreciation. Perfect competition implies wt = (1  )Yt=(HtLt) and
rt = Yt=Kt.
It is well known that full depreciation of capital in one period and the use of Cobb-Douglas
functions for technologies and preferences allow an analytical solution for individuals’ choices in
such a two-sector growth model.5 In order to investigate optimal taxation analytically, we assume
5See, e.g., King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Devereux and Love (1994). These assumptions are also used in
a recent paper by Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998) to analyze public capital in the steady state equilibrium.
5full depreciation of capital in one period, that is H = K = 1.6 We will further exploit the advantage
of these assumptions to derive a welfare function that applies in the initial and all future periods
given the initial states by considering the adjustment of the two types of capital in transition. Thus,
the two-sector growth model here will be able to generate optimal taxation analytically for both
the short run and the long run. In addition to being of interest for their own sake, the qualitative
results should help to guide the direction of future simulations using models of tax mix with partial
depreciation of capital and more complex functional forms.
The government budget constraint is given by
Gt = ct ¯ Ct + ltwt ¯ Ht¯ Lt + ktrt ¯ Kt  sqt ¯ Qt  skt ¯ Kt+1; (6)
where the upper bar on a variable refers to the variable’s aggregate or average value with popu-
lation of unit mass. Eq. (6) means that the net tax revenue for public consumption equals taxes
from private consumption ¯ Ct, labor income wt ¯ Ht¯ Lt, and capital income rt ¯ Kt, minus subsidies on
investments in human and physical capital, sqt ¯ Qt and skt ¯ Kt+1. With identical agents, ¯ Ct = Ct,
¯ Ht¯ Lt = HtLt, ¯ Kt = Kt, and ¯ Qt = Qt in equilibrium.
Deﬁne Θt = (ct;lt;kt;sqt;skt;Gt; ¯ Ht; ¯ Kt;wt;rt), a vector that includes the policy variables,
the average capital stocks, the wage rate, and the interest rate. Given Θ and initial capital stocks
H0 and K0, the representative agent chooses fCt;St;Lt;Ht+1;Kt+1g1
t=0 to maximize (1) subject to
the education technology (3) and the individual’s budget and time constraints (4) and (5). Observe
that average human and physical capital, ¯ Ht and ¯ Kt, aﬀect individuals’ welfare via Gt by (1) and





(1  lt)wtHtLt + (1  kt)rtKt  (1  sqt)Qt  (1  skt)Kt+1
1 + ct
+ln(1  Lt  St) +  lnGt  t[Ht+1  AHQ
t (StHt)1]g; (7)
6This model can also be viewed as an overlapping generations model with two-period lived altruistic agents.
Corresponding to this alternative interpretation of the model, agents are born with zero human capital and parents
invest in children’s education; physical capital investment is bequests to children. The length of a period is then
about 30 years. In this case, full depreciation of capital per period is natural for human capital and is quite realistic
for physical capital.
6where t is the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst-order conditions for (7) are
Lt :
1

































Eq. (8) equates the loss in utility from working for an additional hour (less leisure) to the
gain in utility from earning more income for private consumption. By (9) and (10), the marginal
utility forgone from investing an additional unit of goods, or hour, in human capital is equal to the
marginal utility obtained from the subsequent increase in human capital. In (11), the present value
of the next period’s human capital is equal to the gain in utility from higher earnings and higher
ability in learning later. Eq. (12) says that the loss in utility from investing in physical capital now
will be compensated by the gain in utility from increasing future capital income.
With the log utility function, the Cobb-Douglas production function or eduction technology, full
depreciation of capital per period, and the balanced government budget, agents expect stationary
rates of taxes and subsidies: (c;k;l;sk;sq). Let ¯ Yt = A ¯ K
t( ¯ Ht¯ Lt)1 with ¯ Y = Y in equilibrium.
Eqs. (2)-(6) and (8)-(12) with expected stationary rates of taxes and subsidies lead to
St = S =
(1  )(1  )(1  l)
(1  )(1  l)(2  ) + (1  k)(1  )[1  (1  )]
; (13)
Lt = L =
(1  )(1  l)[1  (1  )]




(1  )f(1  )(1  l) + (1  k)[1  (1  )]g
(1 + c)[1  (1  )]

Yt  cYt; (15)
Qt =
(
(1  )(1  l)
(1  sq)[1  (1  )]
)












Gt = [cc  sqq + l(1  ) + k  skk]¯ Yt  g ¯ Yt: (19)
Expecting stationary rates of taxes and subsidies, households allocate time and income propor-
tionately among the competing uses. These proportional allocations are stationary over time but
responsive to taxes. The fractions of time spent on working and learning are lower the higher is the
tax rate on labor (human capital) income. But the fractions of time spent on working and learning
are higher the higher is the tax rate on physical capital income, reﬂecting a negative income eﬀect
on leisure.7 Thus, labor income taxes and physical capital income taxes aﬀect the time allocation in
opposite directions. These direct eﬀects of income taxes fully oﬀset each other if income tax rates
are uniform. Taxes on human (physical) capital income lower its rate of return and hence lower
the fraction of output invested in human (physical) capital, while investment subsidies encourage
investments. Moreover, income taxes and consumption taxes lower the fraction of income spent on
private consumption.
Deﬁne ht  Ht=Kt and   (1 + )=f(1  )[1  (1  )]g. Given initial stocks of capital
in period 0 (i.e. H0, K0, and h0), we obtain the expressions for the representative agent’s welfare




B(c;k;l;sq;sk) + (1  ) lnh0 +
(1 + )
1  
lnK0 + B0; (20)
with B0 being a constant and
B(c;k;l;sq;sk) = lnc + (1  )lnq + [1  (1  )]lnk + ln(1  S  L)
7The eﬀect of a rise in the physical capital income tax rate on the fractions of time spent on working and
learning can be negative if the tax revenue is used for transfers that vary fully with the tax. In this case, Gt in (6)
would be added to the right-hand side of the private budget constraint, and in equilibrium that constraint would be
Ct = wtHtLt +rtKt Qt Kt+1 after substituting out Gt. Then, a rise in k raises Ct through reducing Kt+1 as in
(17). As can be seen in (8), a rise in Ct in turn reduces the marginal beneﬁt of working for an additional hour (the
right-hand side) and hence a decline in L or S is needed to reduce the marginal beneﬁt of leisure (the left-hand side).
If (i) Gt is public goods or (ii) Gt=Yt is ﬁxed when Gt is a transfer, then from (4) the rise in k reduces Ct through
lowering rtKt(1  k)  Kt+1 = (1  )(1  k)Yt where Kt+1 is given in (17) and sk = 0 is assumed in order to
focus on public goods or exogenous transfers.
8+ lng + (1  )(1  )lnS + (1  )[1  (1  )]lnL;
ln(1 + t) =
(
(1  )[1  t+1(1  )t+1]




 + t+1(1  )t+1(1  )




(1  )(1  )[1  t+1(1  )t+1]









 + (1  )t+1(1  )t+2
i
lnL + (1  )t+1(1  )t+1 lnh0 + mt; (21)
where mt varies with time but is irresponsive to any tax instrument.
Note that since h0 and K0 are taken as initially given and B0 is a constant, any optimal
rates of taxes and subsidies derived from maximizing U0 in (20) are simply from maximizing the
stationary function B by choice of a stationary vector (c;k;l;sk;sq), which is consistent with
agents’ expectation. In addition, the indirect utility function U0 in (20) considers not only welfare
in steady state equilibrium but also that in transition toward the steady state, in contrast to some
previous papers in the literature (e.g., Devarajan, Xie, and Zou, 1998) that only examine steady-
state welfare. Thus optimal taxation derived from (20) applies in both the short run and the long
run in this model. Note also that the growth rate, t, increases with the number of hours spent on
production and education, L and S, as well as with the fractions of output invested in human and
physical capital, q and k.
To be comparable to the existing literature on optimal taxation, we start with the comparison
of consumption taxes and uniform income taxes without subsidies. We then allow subsidies but
impose uniformity on income tax rates. Finally, we allow the full use of tax/subsidy instruments
without imposing prior restrictions on them. In order to compare the diﬀerent tax solutions with
the ﬁrst-best, we ﬁrst provide the social planner’s problem and its solution below.
2.2. Social planner’s solution




t[lnCt + lnZt +  lnGt]; (22)
9by choice of (Ct;Qt;Kt+1;Gt;Lt;St) subject to





Zt = 1  St  Lt: (26)
The solution is given by (see Appendix B for the derivation):
St = S 
(1 + )(1  )(1  )
(1 + )(1  ) + (1  )[1  (1  )]
; (27)
Lt = L 
(1 + )(1  )[1  (1  )]




[1  (1  )]
Yt  cYt; (29)
Qt =
(1  )
1  (1  )
Yt  qYt; (30)
Gt =

[1  (1  )]
Yt  gYt; (31)




The solution for U0 parallels that in (20) with L, S, and the ’s in B being deﬁned in (27)-(32).
Given the same set of technologies and preferences, the solution derived from (22)-(26) dominates
(at least “weakly”) any competitive solution because the constraints (4) and (6) for the latter are
more restrictive than (23) for the former.
How does the social planner’s solution compare with a competitive equilibrium in the absence
of taxes? Setting l = k = c = sk = sq = 0 in (13)-(19) we see that in the no-government solution
(i) public goods, Gt = 0, (ii) schooling and work time, St and Lt are less than in the ﬁrst-best, and
10therefore leisure, Zt, is higher, (iii) the fractions of output devoted to human and physical capital
investment, q and k, are the same as in the ﬁrst-best, and (iv) the fraction of output devoted to
private consumption is the same as that devoted to private plus public goods in the ﬁrst-best. Since
time spent on working or going to school is less than in the ﬁrst-best, it is also clear that national
income, Yt, is below the Pareto optimal level in the no-government solution. Finally, welfare is
lower in the no-government equilibrium, as is evident from the fact that the marginal utility of
public goods is (positively) inﬁnite at Gt = 0.
2.3. Optimal taxation with uniform income taxes and/or consumption taxes
Let us look at uniform income taxation ﬁrst. Suppose a uniform proportional income tax at
a rate y (= l = k) is the only available tax instrument. In this situation we note that g = y
for budget balance. Also, from (13)-(19) we see that time allocation is unchanged from its (non-
optimal) no-government pattern, while the investment rates q and k fall below their levels without
taxes. The decline in investments means that, after the ﬁrst period, national income, Yt, is below
its zero tax level, which was already suboptimal. We have:
Proposition 1. In the absence of a consumption tax and subsidies, the optimal uniform income
tax rate is 
y = 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g. The ratio of public consumption to output, 
g, is the
same as in the ﬁrst-best.




y under (19), which is equal to g in (31). 2
The optimal uniform income tax rate, or the ratio of public consumption to output, depends
positively on the taste for public consumption () and negatively on the importance of physical
capital in production (), the importance of physical inputs in education (), and the discount
factor (). Note also that under uniform income taxation, public consumption accounts for the
same fraction of output as in the social planner’s solution. However, public consumption, like
output, is below the Pareto optimal level.
Because of the distortions of the uniform income tax, the allocations of time and income are
11not the same as in the social planner’s solution. Speciﬁcally, leisure is higher, while investments
in physical and human capital are lower, than Pareto optimal levels. The reason for the under-
investment in capital is obvious because uniform income taxation without subsidies lowers the
private rate of return on investments in capital. However, the reason for the over-consumption of
leisure is less obvious. From (13) and (14), the uniform income tax rate cancels out all the direct
tax eﬀects on time allocation. It might therefore appear that the income tax does not distort the
choice of leisure. The key, of course, is to compare the choice of leisure with the amount that would
be chosen under an optimal lump-sum tax. Since the latter would have only an income eﬀect,
and no substitution eﬀect, it would reduce the amount of leisure chosen in any speciﬁcation where
leisure was a normal good, as it is here.
The result that a uniform income tax has no impact on the allocation of time, including the
choice of leisure, is due to our use of Cobb-Douglas preferences. In this case income and substitution
eﬀects of the uniform income tax are equal but opposite in sign. While a more general model would
of course be desirable, it would be less tractable. And since labor supply is quite inelastic on
average empirically, the Cobb-Douglas case at least has relevance and plausibility.
Next, suppose instead that only a proportional consumption tax (c) is available. In this case,
we see from (13)-(19) that proportional time allocations are again unaﬀected by the tax (leisure,
Zt, remains above the Pareto optimal level), but in addition the investment rates q and k are
now unaﬀected by the tax rate. Then the optimal tax scheme is given by:
Proposition 2. In the absence of income taxes and subsidies, the optimal consumption tax rate is

c = . Under the optimal tax scheme, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.





c = =f[1  (1  )]g under (13)-(19). 2
The optimal consumption tax rate depends only on the importance of public consumption ().
Note that the ratio of public consumption to income is the same as that in the uniform income
tax case and in the social planner’s solution. Since the tax revenue as a fraction of output is the
same as that in the uniform income tax case and the consumption tax base is smaller than the
12income tax base, starting from the initial period the optimal consumption tax rate is higher than
the optimal income tax rate (
c > 
y). Since the investment rates are higher than under uniform
income taxation, the consumption tax economy will enjoy a higher growth rate, and higher output
after the initial period.
Now suppose that a consumption tax and a uniform income tax are the only tax instruments:
Proposition 3. In the absence of subsidies, the optimal combined income and consumption tax
rates are 
y = 0 and 
c = . Under the optimal tax scheme, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Proof. The tax solution is obtained from @B=@c = 0, @B=@y = 0, and (13)-(19). The rest of the
proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. 2
Even if a uniform income tax is available, the government should use only the consumption tax
when subsidies are not used. Thus the lack of intertemporal distortions under the consumption tax
makes it superior to the uniform income tax in the present model. This proposition accords with
the result from a large number of existing studies on taxation. However, this result is subject to the
constraint of the available tax/subsidy instruments. As we will see below, if subsidies are available,
they can correct the investment distortions caused by income taxes. In that case, consumption
taxes will not necessarily be better than income taxes.
Now we look at a richer menu of tax/subsidy instruments while maintaining uniformity of
income tax rates. Assume that the menu includes a uniform income tax (y), a consumption tax
(c), an education subsidy (sq), and an investment tax credit (sk). All elements of this menu ﬁnd use
in the real world and thus it is important to know how well the combinations of the taxes/subsidies
can perform. In this case, the size of the net revenue from the combination of the labor income
tax and the human capital investment subsidy is ywt ¯ Ht¯ Lt  sq ¯ Qt in (6), or [y(1  )  sqq]¯ Yt in
(19). Similarly, the size of the net revenue from the combination of the physical capital income tax
and the investment tax credit is yrt ¯ Kt  sk ¯ Kt+1 in (6), or [y  skk]¯ Yt in (19). These net tax
revenues are positive if the rates of the subsidy and the tax credit are low enough.8 The optimal
8More precisely, by (16) and (17), the net revenues are positive if sq < [1(1)]y=f[1(1)]y+(1y)g
and sk < y=[y + (1  y)]. Obviously, these inequalities hold if y = sq = sk as in Proposition 4 below.
13tax schemes in this case are described by:
Proposition 4. The optimal tax schemes with a uniform income tax, a consumption tax, an




q  0, 0  
c  , and 1 + 
c = (1  
y)(1 + ). Under all the optimal schemes,

g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Proof. See Appendix C.
All the optimal schemes in Proposition 4 provide exactly the same equilibrium solution in (13)-
(21) and satisfy the budget constraints (4) and (6), and are thus equivalent. The equivalence is
more intuitive when rewriting (4) under the optimal schemes as





which is the same across the schemes under (1
y)=(1+
c ) = 1=(1+). Note that the tax schemes
here include those in Propositions 2 and 3. Putting it diﬀerently, a uniform income tax enriched by
investment subsidies can perform just as well as a consumption tax, or as various mixes of both.
The key to the equivalence in Proposition 4 is that the uniform income tax it considers allows
immediate expensing of all investments, for both human and physical capital. This form of tax
is referred to as a “cash-ﬂow” tax. Since it subsidizes investment costs at the same rate at which
their payoﬀs are taxed, it is intertemporally non-distortionary. On the physical capital side it has
been widely advocated as a replacement for the corporate income tax since the recommendations
of the Meade Committee in the United Kingdom and the “Blueprints” report in the United States
came out.9
A cash-ﬂow tax on business income is one of the two central planks of the form of consumption
tax advocated by Hall and Rabushka (1995). Since the Hall-Rabushka tax would also fall on labor
income at the same rate as on business income, the uniform income tax of Proposition 4 corresponds
with a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme, in which there is a deduction for the costs of education and
9See Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978, and United States Department of the Treasury, 1977. Boadway, Bruce and
Mintz (1983, 84) provided a rigorous treatment in a partial equilibrium framework. Lucas (1990) noted that a tax
on capital income with an investment tax credit can imitate a capital levy perfectly. We extend this argument to a
general equilibrium setting with endogenous leisure and human capital.
14training. Note that the proposition indicates that all combinations of this form of Hall-Rabushka
tax and a consumption tax that produce the required revenue are equally acceptable.
Note ﬁnally that (i) 
y = s
k = s
q = 0 and 
c =  and (ii) 




are optimal schemes implied by Proposition 4. These two special schemes mean that the pure
uniform income tax rate is always lower than the pure consumption tax rate, because the income
tax base is larger than the consumption tax base. For this reason, there are often concerns about
whether a switch from an income tax to a consumption tax is ideal since a high consumption tax
rate relative to the income tax rate may be harmful. Our result here indicates that even though
a switch from an income tax with subsidies to a consumption tax entails a decline in the tax base
and a rise in the tax rate, there is neither harm nor gain.
2.4. Optimal taxation with non-uniform income taxes and/or consumption taxes
In this section, we relax the uniformity restriction on income taxes. We start with zero subsidies
as in the previous section for ease of comparison. In the ﬁrst case, we only consider income
taxes (l;k). The government budget constraint in this case is g = (1  )l + k. Deﬁne
Λ1 = (1  )(2  )(1  l) + (1  )(1  k)[1  (1  )]. The optimal income taxation is:
Proposition 5. In the absence of a consumption tax, and without subsidies, optimal income tax
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15Proof. Diﬀerentiating the welfare function in (20) with respect to k or l provides (34) and (35).
With the uniformity l = k = y > 0, it is easy to verify that each of (34) and (35) leads to a
solution for y and that the two solutions for y are diﬀerent in general. 2
When income taxes are the only tax instruments, uniformity of the two tax rates is generally
not optimal, owing to their asymmetric inﬂuences on leisure and investment in human and physical
capital. Both taxes distort investments in a similar way, but labor income taxation increases leisure
from a already high level while taxation of physical capital income reduces leisure. From (13) and
(14), if the discount factor  is smaller then time allocations are more sensitive to income taxes (in
terms of percentage changes in L and S). From (16) and (17), percentage changes in investments
as fractions of output (q and k) are simply 1=(1  l) and 1=(1  k), which are independent
of the value of . Thus, when  is small, distortions on time allocations (especially under labor
income taxation) are important, so it may be better to tax physical capital income more heavily
than labor income. When  is large, the converse may be true.
In Table 1, we illustrate the implications of Proposition 5 in an example where we set  = 0:1,
 = 0:4, and  = 0:3 but allow  to vary from 0.1 to 0.9.10 When  is small, the physical capital
income tax rate is higher than the labor income tax rate; when  has mid values the two tax rates
are similar; and when  is large, the labor income tax rate becomes large and the physical capital
income tax rate becomes negative.
When a consumption tax is used together with income taxes, the government budget constraint
is g = cc + (1  )l + k. We then have:
Proposition 6. In the absence of subsidies, optimal tax rates on consumption and the two types
10The parameterization is plausible. Capital’s share in output  is about 30%. The taste for public consumption
 is chosen to have a reasonable ratio of public consumption to output, which also declines in . The value of 
is less known and many existing studies assume that it is smaller than the capital’s share parameter in production,
meaning that education is more time intensive and less (physical) capital intensive than production. In addition to
 = 0:1, we also did simulations with  = 0:3 and found similar results. Corresponding to full depreciation of capital,
one period here may be 20-30 years. For an annual discounting factor in the range of 0.95 to 0.98, the compounding
discounting factor over 30 years may range from 0.2 to 0.8.
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[1  (1  )]
1  k

(1  )(1  )(1  l)[1  (1  )]
Λ1[Λ1  (1  )(1  l)]
+
(1  )(1  )[1  (1  )]
Λ1
= 0: (38)
Under the optimal scheme, [1  (1  )]
k = (1  )
l , 
l < 0, 0 < 
k < 1, 
c > 0,
and 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g. The feasible solution (c;l;k) = (;0;0) is not optimal, where
@B=@c = 0, @B=@l < 0, and @B=@k > 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When both income and consumption taxes are used without uniformity on income taxes, optimal
taxation features positive taxes on consumption and physical capital income but negative taxes on
labor income. Taxing consumption accords with existing views in the literature. What is surprising
here is that physical capital income should be taxed as well, while labor income is subsidized. Taxing
consumption avoids investment distortions, taxing physical capital and subsidizing labor income
reduce the labor-leisure distortion, and subsidizing labor also raises investment in human capital.
This tax mix can thus do better than pure income taxation, pure consumption taxation, or a mix
of uniform income taxation and consumption taxation.
We report simulation results based on (36)-(38) in Table 2 for a wide range of the value of the
discount factor . The values of the tax rates on consumption and physical capital income, the
subsidy rate on labor income (i.e. l when l < 0), and the ratio of public consumption to output
17are inversely related to the value of . When  is large, the income tax (subsidy) rates are quite
small and the consumption tax is the main instrument to fund public consumption.
As we found earlier, a pure consumption tax is equivalent to a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax that
allows a deduction for costs of education, or a revenue neutral combination of the two. This means
that the insight from Proposition 6 that taxing physical capital more heavily and labor less heavily
eﬀects a welfare improvement can be applied to a diﬀerent starting point: namely one where there
is some element of the modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax. This observation leads to:
Proposition 7. If the tax and subsidy rates are all constrained to be non-negative, it is possible to
improve on a pure consumption tax via a tax/subsidy scheme in which: (i) c, l, k, sk, sq  0,
(ii) k > l, (iii) k > sk, and (iv) l < sq.
Proof. Start from an initial system that displays a mix of a pure consumption tax and a modiﬁed
Hall-Rabushka tax. This system (which is equivalent to a pure consumption tax) will have c > 0
and k = l = sk = sq > 0. Proposition 6 implies that welfare can be improved, relative to this
starting point, by increasing k and reducing l. 2
We argue in Section 4 that this proposition points to a set of relations between tax and subsidy
rates that is qualitatively realistic for a range of countries.
Table 3 illustrates Proposition 7 in a simulated example starting with a mix of a 5% consumption
tax, a 25% uniform income tax, and 25% subsidy rates on investment in human and physical capital.
A parameter conﬁguration that supports this tax mix to be an optimal scheme in Proposition 4 is
 = 0:1,  = 0:4,  = 0:3, and  = 0:5, implying a 22.47% optimal ratio of tax revenue to output.
Note that from Proposition 4, such a tax mix is equivalent to a 40% pure consumption tax (), or
to a 28.57% modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax where l = k = sk = sq = =(1 + ). Deviations from
this tax mix, through raising the physical capital income tax by one percentage point at a time and
lowering the labor income tax correspondingly to maintain the 22.47% optimal ratio of tax revenue
to output, improve welfare when the physical capital income tax rate is below 36%. Any further
increase in the physical capital income tax, together with a decline in the labor income tax, leads
18to a marginal loss in welfare.
Now we further enlarge the menu of the tax/subsidy instruments. Suppose that the government
can set all tax/subsidy rates (c;l;k;sq;sk) without sign restrictions. In so doing, we consider
two versions with elastic or inelastic leisure, corresponding to i = 1 and i = 0 respectively in (1),
since both versions regarding leisure are seen in the literature on optimal taxation. First, consider
the case with inelastic leisure where time is allocated only between education and production. The








The other ﬁrst-order conditions are the same as in the case with elastic leisure. Solving the original
optimization problem with this modiﬁcation gives
St = S  (1  ); (39)
Lt = L  1  (1  ): (40)
The solution for other variables remains the same. Correspondingly, we have
B(c;k;l;sq;sk) = lnc + (1  )lnq + [1  (1  )]lnk +  lng: (41)




t[lnCt +  lnGt]; (42)
by choice of (Ct;Qt;Kt+1;Gt;Lt;St) subject to (23)-(26) with (26) being replaced by St + Lt = 1,
given (K0;H0). The solution for Ct;Qt;Gt;Kt+1 and Ht+1 is the same as that in the case with
elastic leisure, while the solution for St and Lt is the same as that in (39) and (40); see Appendix
B for derivation. Note that the time allocation with inelastic leisure is the same in both the
decentralized equilibrium and the social planner’s problem since now there is no over-consumption
of leisure by assumption. The solution for U0 parallels that in (20) and (41) with the ’s being
deﬁned in (29)-(32).
19The optimal taxation with inelastic leisure is given by:
Proposition 8. With inelastic leisure, the Pareto optimal tax/subsidy systems include all combi-




k and (ii) (1 + 
c ) = (1  )f(1 
)(1  
l ) + (1  





k  0, 0  
c  , and
1 + 
c = (1 + )(1  
y). Under the optimal tax schemes, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The tax schemes in Proposition 8 set equal rates for income taxes and investment subsidies
so that the under-investment problem is corrected, and thereby these tax schemes are ﬁrst-best
with inelastic leisure. As a special case in Proposition 8, the results in Proposition 4 with uniform
income taxes and consumption taxes are now ﬁrst-best when leisure is inelastic.
Also, note that when  = 0, the model degenerates to a one-capital (human capital) model. Then
all combinations of 
c > 0 and 




are optimal. When  = 1, the model also becomes a one-capital (physical capital) model, and
the optimal tax schemes include all combinations of 
c  0 and 




g = (1)=(1+). The special case with inelastic leisure and with only physical capital is similar
to that in Turnovsky (1996) where the composition of revenues from income and consumption taxes
is determined by the degree of public goods congestion. But in Proposition 8 the subsidy-enriched
income taxes and the consumption tax are perfect substitutes so that if leisure is inelastic, then
ﬁrst-best taxation includes all possible mixes of consumption and income taxes with subsidies at
the same rate.
What happens to optimal taxation if leisure is elastic? In this case, a uniform income tax cannot
achieve the ﬁrst-best, as seen in Proposition 4. Without uniformity of income tax rates, the size of
the net revenue from the combination of the labor income tax and the human capital investment
subsidy is lwt ¯ Ht¯ Lt  sq ¯ Qt in (6), or [l(1  )  sqq]¯ Yt in (19). Similarly, the size of the net
revenue from the combination of the physical capital income tax and the investment tax credit is
krt ¯ Ktsk ¯ Kt+1 in (6), or [kskk]¯ Yt in (19). These net tax revenues are positive if the rates of the
subsidy and the tax credit are low enough. Moreover, from (19) g = c+l(1)sqq+kskk,
20and hence public consumption may be ﬁnanced by one or two taxes while the other taxes may be
zero or negative. For example, we may have a positive consumption tax but negative income taxes
as long as the net revenue is positive for public consumption. Optimal taxation in this case is given
by:
Proposition 9. When all of (c;k;l;sk;sq) may be set freely, without sign restrictions, all com-







k = (1  
l )

[1  (1  )]  (1  )
(1 + )[1  (1  )]

< (1  
l ): (43)
are Pareto optimal, that is ﬁrst-best. Under all the optimal schemes, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The Pareto optimal tax schemes with elastic leisure have the following important features. First,
a uniform income tax with subsidies at the same rate and a consumption tax are ﬁrst-best with
inelastic leisure but not so with elastic leisure. This is because a uniform income tax with subsidies
or a consumption tax both cause the familiar static distortion on the goods-leisure margin. Here,
setting the consumption tax and labor income tax rates equal but with opposite signs eliminates
that distortion.11





k). These equalities of the income tax and subsidy rates, respectively for
both types of income, eliminate under-investment in human and physical capital.
Third, the relationship between capital and labor income taxes given by (43), along with the
same rate but opposite signs of consumption and labor income taxes, achieves the Pareto optimal
ratios of private and public consumption to income. From this and the second point above, the
Pareto optimal proportional output allocation is thus reached by the tax schemes in Proposition 9.
Fourth, the relations between labor and physical capital income taxes and between consumption
and labor income taxes in Proposition 9 achieve the ﬁrst-best time allocation by reducing leisure.
11It might appear to do so at the cost of eliminating the labor income and the portion of consumption funded by
labor income as a source of net revenue. That conclusion ignores both the subsidy, sq, which reduces the net revenue
from taxing the return to human capital, and the fact that a portion of labor income is saved, reducing consumption
tax revenue.
21To see this, let us ﬁrst divide both the numerators and denominators of the right-hand sides in
(13) and (14) by (1  l), resulting in the factor (1  k)=(1  l) in the denominators. Obviously,
the higher the factor (1k)=(1l), the less the time spent on education and production (or the
higher the leisure). Under either zero or uniform income taxes, this factor is unity; but with the
relation in Proposition 9, this factor is always less than unity, i.e. (1  k)=(1  l) = f[1  (1 
)]  (1  )g=f(1 + )[1  (1  )]g < 1. For l < 1 and k < 1, it follows that k > l.12
The idea is to tax income from eﬀective labor more lightly than from physical capital to encourage
greater use of time in education and production rather than in leisure, in contrast to the case with
inelastic leisure in Proposition 8 where the two income taxes are perfect substitutes. This idea
was exempliﬁed earlier in Table 2 and Proposition 6. When consumption taxes are positive, labor
income taxes become a net subsidy even though the education subsidy becomes a tax at the same
rate according to c = l = sq. This is because the labor income tax base 1   is greater than
the education subsidy base (1  )=[1  (1  )] in (16).
Furthermore, if k = 0 and l < 1 then 1l > 1 must hold under the Pareto optimal taxation
since (1  k)=(1  l) < 1, implying l < 0 and hence c = l > 0. Namely, when the tax on
physical capital income is zero, the consumption tax is positive and the labor income tax net of
education subsidies is negative or a net subsidy for labor income. This net subsidy for labor income,




q = 0 and 
k = s
k = [1  (1  )]=f(1 + )[1  (1  )]g is a special
Pareto optimal scheme. That is, taxing physical capital income and providing an investment tax
credit at the same rate without other tax/subsidy instruments is Pareto optimal when the net tax
revenue as a fraction of income is equal to the optimal ratio of public consumption to income 
g.
This special scheme reveals some important insights: (i) labor and physical capital income taxes
are not symmetric, (ii) consumption taxes are not necessarily better than capital income taxes, and
(iii) a switch from physical capital income taxes to either labor income taxes or consumption taxes
12To be practically relevant, income tax rates should be below 100%. This corresponds to  < [1(1)]=(1).
In other words, Proposition 9 has a practical value if the taste for public goods is not too strong relative to private
goods (i.e.  is not too large).
22can be welfare reducing.
The intuition behind the above results can be summarized as follows. The cash ﬂow form of
tax on physical capital income (k = sk) is eﬀectively lump-sum. Sole reliance on this source of
revenue allows the ﬁrst-best to be achieved. However, the ﬁrst-best outcome can also be attained
with non-zero consumption and labor income tax rates and a subsidy on human capital investment,
provided that these latter rates are set to avoid any eﬀect on the shadow price of leisure or the rate
of return to human capital investment.13 Provided the latter conditions are met, a wide range of
alternative tax/subsidy mixes can achieve the ﬁrst-best.
According to Proposition 9, the eﬀective tax on human or physical capital income is generally
non-zero. For example, when the physical capital income tax is used exclusively and physical capital
investment is subsidized at the same rate (
k = s
k > 0 and 
c = 
l = s
q = 0), we have noted
that the net tax revenue is positive. Also, the presence of subsidies on investment leads to diﬀerent
results compared to previous ones without such subsidies. These features of optimal taxation in
our model diﬀer from that in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) where eﬀective taxes (i.e. taxes net
of subsidies) on labor and capital income are zero (in the long run) independently of the details of
the tax code with respect to available tax instruments (such as taxes or subsidies, excluding lump
sum taxes).
2.5. Depreciation allowances
In the last scenario, we consider another feature of the tax code practiced in some countries:
a capital depreciation allowance. In addition to all the tax instruments discussed in Proposition
9, suppose the government can also use a capital depreciation allowance dkt ( 0).14 With this
instrument, the budget constraints become
Gt = c ¯ Ct + lwt ¯ Ht¯ Lt + k(rt  dkt) ¯ Kt  sq ¯ Qt  sk ¯ Kt+1; (44)
(1 + c)Ct = (1  l)wtHtLt + [(1  k)rt + kdkt]Kt  (1  sq)Qt  (1  sk)Kt+1: (45)
13Under Proposition 9 the consumption tax base is greater than the labor income tax base net of education subsidy
because c + q  (1  ) = (1  

k)(1  )=(1 + 

c ) > 0 for 1 + 

c > 0 and 

k < 1.
14As will be seen below, the optimal capital depreciation allowance is time dependent. Also, recall that in our
model the capital depreciation rate is 100% per period.





[(1  k)rt+1 + kdk(t+1)]
Ct+1
: (46)
The other ﬁrst-order conditions are the same as (8)-(11).
Let yt  Yt=Kt = A(Ltht)1 and ˜ dkt  dkt=yt, where ˜ dkt is the output-capital ratio adjusted
capital depreciation allowance. The ﬁrst-order conditions and the budget constraints lead to the
same form of solution for U0 as in (20) and the solution for other variables as:
St = S =
(1  )(1  )(1  l)
(1  )(1  l) + [1  (1  )](1 + c)c
; (47)
Lt = L =
(1  )(1  l)[1  (1  )]




(1  )f(1  )(1  l) + (1  k)[1  (1  )]g
(1 + c)[1  (1  )]
+







[(1  k) + k ˜ dk(t+1)]
1  sk
#
Yt  kYt; (50)
Gt = [cc  sqq + l(1  ) + k  skk  k ˜ dkt]¯ Yt  g ¯ Yt: (51)
Note that c, St, and Lt are time independent if the optimal ˜ d
kt is time independent.
The optimal tax schemes with the depreciation allowance are given by:
Proposition 10. With all tax instruments available, including depreciation allowances, the Pareto-







kt = ˜ d




k = (1  
l )

[1  (1  )]  (1  )
(1 + )[1  (1  )]

: (52)
Under all the optimal schemes, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Proof. See Appendix G.
24The optimal tax schemes in Proposition 10 include all the tax schemes in Proposition 9 and
share all the features in Proposition 9 except that 
k and s
k are not required to be always the
same due to the availability of the capital depreciation allowance instrument. From the optimal
(output-capital ratio adjusted) capital depreciation allowance ˜ d
k = (1  s
k=
k), we can see that
the capital depreciation allowance and the investment tax credit are perfect policy substitutes. The
government can use either the capital depreciation allowance or the investment tax credit or both,
along with other tax/subsidy instruments, to achieve the Pareto optimal outcome. Obviously, if the
investment tax credit rate is the same as the tax rate on capital income (s
k = 
k), then the capital
depreciation allowance instrument is redundant (˜ d
k = 0). Similarly, if the capital depreciation
allowance is set at ˜ d
k = , the investment tax credit instrument also becomes redundant (s
k = 0).
Note that the output-capital ratio adjusted capital depreciation allowance ˜ d
k (hence c, L, and
S) is time independent but the unadjusted d
kt is not so; the latter depends positively on the
output/capital ratio yt.
3. Comparison of the tax schemes
The optimal tax schemes with elastic leisure in Section 2 can be ranked according to their resulting
growth rates of output and welfare levels. (With inelastic leisure, the optimal tax schemes in
Proposition 8 obtain the ﬁrst-best outcome.) Let ti and Ui be the growth rate and the welfare
level, respectively, for the optimal tax schemes in Proposition i.
We ﬁrst look at the ranking of growth rates. Since we have not obtained analytical tax solutions
for Propositions 5, 6, and 7, they are excluded in the following ranking.
Proposition 11. With elastic leisure, t9 = t10 > t2 = t3 = t4 > t1.
Proof. See Appendix H.
The intuition of this ranking can be easily understood from the formula for the growth rate
of per capita output. The formula indicates that the growth rate depends positively on the time
spent on working and learning, (S and L), and on human and physical capital investments, (q
and k). According to Proposition 11, the schemes with more tax/subsidy instruments but less
25prior restrictions generate faster growth. The reason is simple: more policy instruments and more
ﬂexibility can do better to remove the distortions of taxation.
The welfare ranking of the tax schemes across the propositions is given below.
Proposition 12. With elastic leisure, U9 = U10 > U2 = U3 = U4 > U1.
Proof. See Appendix I.
The ranking of welfare levels is the same as that of growth rates. The intuition is that for these
tax schemes the dynamic ineﬃciency associated with the growth eﬀects of taxes dominates the
welfare ranking: the optimal tax schemes that generate faster growth by encouraging investments of
time and income in education and production also make individuals better oﬀ. For welfare rankings
concerning Propositions 5, 6, and 7, recall our earlier discussions: U9 > U7 = U6 > U5 > U1 and
U7 = U6 > U2 = U3 = U4. The comparison between U5 and U2 is unclear.
The eﬀects of taxes on growth and welfare have recently received a great deal of attention;
see, e.g., Barro (1990), Caball´ e (1998), Cooley and Hansen (1992), Davies and Whalley (1989),
Hendrichs (1999), Judd (1987), Lucas (1990), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a, 1998b), Rebelo
(1991), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), and Trostel (1993), in addition to the work mentioned in the
introduction. Our results on the growth and welfare rankings extend this line of research to consider
more tax/subsidy instruments and more tax regimes.
Finally, under all the second-best schemes with uniform income taxes or with consumption
taxes, and under all the ﬁrst-best tax schemes, the ratio of public spending (net tax revenue) to
income is the same as required by a Pareto optimum. In other words, the ratio of tax revenue
to output is the same across all these optimal tax schemes, suggesting that most of the optimal
taxation problem in this paper can be reformulated as a Ramsey problem where the tax revenue
goes back to individuals as lump-sum transfers rather than public consumption, as shown below.
Let Tt be a transfer funded by taxes as in (6). Due to the modeling of endogenous growth in our
model in contrast to the original Ramsey problem, we modify the assumption of a ﬁxed transfer
in the standard Ramsey problem to one where a ﬁxed fraction of output is provided as transfers,
i.e. g = Tt=Yt for all t. The optimal taxation problem now is to ﬁnd the least costly tax schemes
26to ﬁnance the transfers. Accordingly, assume  = 0 to abstract from public consumption, and add
the transfer, Tt, to the right-hand side of (4). Then the government and the representative agent’s
budget constraints are respectively
gYt = Tt  c ¯ Ct + lwt ¯ Ht¯ Lt + krt ¯ Kt  sq ¯ Qt  sk ¯ Kt+1; (53)
(1 + c)Ct = (1  l)wtHtLt + (1  k)rtKt  (1  sq)Qt  (1  sk)Kt+1 + gYt: (54)
The optimal taxation in the modiﬁed Ramsey problem is given by:
Proposition 13. The optimal schemes with a ﬁxed fraction of output as lump-sum transfers, g,







l = g=[(1  )].
Proof. See Appendix J.
From this proposition, we can see that the main features in Proposition 9 still hold true in
the case with transfers accounting for a ﬁxed portion of output. In particular, 
k > 
l so long as
g > 0. If transfers were fully adjustable, and there were no public goods, optimal taxation in this
model would be trivial: zero tax rates and no transfer.
4. Applications
It is interesting to ask what implications our model may have for real-world tax mix or for tax
reform proposals. It might appear that governments ought to implement tax systems consistent
with our Proposition 9 (equivalently, Proposition 10), based on our most general case. At least
one aspect of this proposition has a strong echo in the real world. The proposition says that there
is a continuum of ﬁrst-best tax schemes, and we certainly observe a wide variety of tax systems.
(This is reﬂected e.g. in Table 4.) However, we run into trouble with speciﬁc prescriptions about
tax and subsidy rates. To begin with, both human and physical capital must have subsidies at the
same rate at which they are taxed. Tax systems that implement this precise provision are seldom
observed. And to make matters worse, wage and consumption tax rates must be equal in absolute
terms, but of opposite sign.
To get realistic predictions from our model it must be recognized that there are practical con-
straints on subsidy and tax rates. The latter stem, e.g., from the need to limit evasion and avoidance.
27Key aspects to take note of include: (i) marginal revenue losses due to evasion and avoidance likely
increase with tax rates, as discussed e.g. by Boadway et al. (1994), and (ii) subsidies delivered
through the tax system, or negative tax rates, give agents incentives to exaggerate subsidized ex-
penditures or income. Another important point to note is that very sizeable subsidies in kind are
provided in the form of public schools and publicly supported colleges and universities. It may be
that these subsidies are to an extent exogenous to the design of the tax system, and greater than
would be justiﬁed on eﬃciency grounds (e.g. externalities and borrowing constraints).
Summing up real-world constraints, tax designers may have to accept that (i) tax rates on
income and consumption must be positive, (ii) subsidies delivered via the tax system cannot be
too large, and (iii) substantial subsidies to human capital investment will be delivered outside the
tax system. These considerations put us far outside the world of Proposition 9. But they do not
preclude the design of an attractive tax system. We will show this ﬁrst by demonstrating that they
do not prevent the implementation of a consumption tax approach, and then that it is possible to
go further and improve on the latter. When we do so we arrive at a system that, qualitatively, is
similar to the tax systems observed in the United States and many other countries.
Consider ﬁrst how a tax designer aiming at the consumption tax approach could work within
the above constraints. Note that he could not just adopt a pure consumption tax because the
existence of the human capital subsidy is a deviation from that approach. Recall, however, that a
pure consumption tax is equivalent to a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax. Suppose that direct subsidies
to education exceeded those justiﬁed on eﬃciency grounds by, say, 30 % points. One could then,
in eﬀect, implement a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme by taxing both labor and physical capital
income at 30 %, allowing no subsidy to human capital investment in the tax system, and delivering
a 30% subsidy to physical capital investment. This approach would only diﬀer from a 30% modiﬁed
Hall-Rabushka tax by providing its subsidy to human capital investment outside the tax system.
Now, it could be that this system would be suﬃcient to collect the required revenue, but there
might be a shortfall. If so, any revenue shortfall could be corrected by adding a pure consumption
tax.
28The outcome described bears some similarity to tax systems that are observed in practice.
However, the uniformity of tax burdens on human and physical capital, and the extent of the gen-
erosity towards physical capital investment do not appear realistic. Consider then the implications
of Proposition 7. That proposition tells us that, starting from the mixed consumption tax/modiﬁed
Hall-Rabushka tax, we can raise welfare by increasing the tax on physical capital income and re-
ducing that on labor income. We then end with a tax/subsidy system that is remarkably realistic:
(i) consumption, labor income, and physical capital income are all taxed at a positive rate; (ii)
physical capital is taxed at a higher rate than labor income; (iii) direct costs of education and
training are not subsidized via the tax system, and (iv) physical capital income is taxed at a higher
rate than that at which physical capital investment is subsidized.15
It is interesting to relate this discussion to the range of tax mixes observed across the G7
countries, as shown in Table 4. The table shows that the two countries with the lowest overall
tax burden, Japan and the U.S., make relatively little use of consumption taxes compared with
the other countries. In terms of the above discussion this might be explained as follows. Not
only do these two countries have relatively small overall revenue requirements, but like the other
G7 countries they also have highly developed public school systems and strong public support for
higher education. Thus, if one wanted to take a consumption tax approach in these countries, given
the need to oﬀset a high subsidy rate to human capital investment from outside the tax system, one
would rely more on the Hall-Rabushka element, and less on the pure consumption tax element than
in countries with a higher overall revenue requirement. Even after the welfare-raising adjustment
of increasing the tax on physical capital and reducing that on labor, one would expect a lower tax
on consumption than in the other G7 countries.
Note some of the implications of the above discussion for tax reform. We do not conclude
15This tax/subsidy system corresponds fairly well to what is observed in the United States and other wealthy
English-speaking countries, Japan, and many smaller countries. It does not correspond fully to what is observed in
many European countries, however, where e.g. capital income taxes are lighter than labor income taxes. Consider
the four points listed in the text in turn. (i) That the various taxes are levied at signiﬁcant positive rates is clear from
Table 4. (ii) Among the G-7 countries Mendoza et al. (1994, Tables 2 and 3) show that capital income taxes have
traditionally been much higher than labor income taxes in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and Japan. (iii) Deductions
or credits for tuition are typically absent or partial. And (iv) since interest and depreciation allowances do not cover
the full costs of capital, capital income is taxed at a rate higher than the eﬀective subsidy on physical investment.
29that the object of reform should be a consumption tax approach, accomplished either via a pure
consumption tax or the modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka scheme. This means that our analysis does not,
for example, support a strict cash-ﬂow approach to the taxation of business income. And it rejects
the suggestion that labor income and physical capital income should be taxed at the same rate,
indicating instead that physical capital should be taxed more heavily than human capital.
Finally, we should note that tax rates on physical capital income have been falling recently in
many countries, and may already be below those on labor income in some cases. Does this mean
that governments are ignoring the logic of our Proposition 7? An alternative explanation for their
behavior lies in open economy considerations. Our analysis has been for a closed economy. In
the real world there is considerable international capital mobility, and the sensitivity of capital
movements to taxes is increasing. The reduction in capital income tax rates could thus just be the
result of tax competition, rather than representing a welfare-improving trend.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the optimal mixes of various tax/subsidy instruments and the tax
treatment of capital incomes in a simple endogenous growth model with both physical and human
capital accumulation where taxes are used to fund the provision of pure public consumption goods.
We derived analytically the optimal rates of taxes and subsidies that apply not only in the steady
state but also in transition toward the steady state. Several interesting results were obtained. If
leisure is inelastic a range of tax mixes are equivalent. A pure consumption tax is ﬁrst-best, but
cash-ﬂow taxes on human or physical capital (investment costs subsidized at the same rate income
is taxed) can also be used since they are non-distortionary. If leisure is elastic, but investment
subsidies cannot be used, a consumption tax does better than a uniform income tax, but can be
improved on by taxing consumption less and introducing a positive tax on physical capital and a
negative tax on labor income. Finally, if investment subsidies are allowed, the ﬁrst-best can be
achieved in a range of tax schemes that have the following features: (i) if consumption and labor
income taxes are non-zero they are of the same rate but opposite signs, (ii) the tax rate on physical
30capital income exceeds that on labor income, (iii) subsidy rates on investments equal income tax
rates, for both forms of capital, that is both kinds of capital are subject to cash-ﬂow taxes. Under
all the optimal schemes studied, public goods account for the same fraction of output. We can
assume, alternatively, that government revenue is used to pay a lump-sum transfer that is set as a
pre-speciﬁed proportion of output without disturbing our results.
As discussed in Section 4 we believe these results may help us to understand real-world tax
systems, especially if a few practical considerations outside the model are taken into account. One
of these is that the marginal revenue losses due to evasion or avoidance likely increase with tax
rates, implying that a mix of taxes has an advantage, ceteris paribus. Another is that negative tax
rates or very high subsidies are likely to cause exaggeration of the subsidized forms of income or
expenditure by taxpayers. Further, large in-kind subsidies to education are provided outside the
tax system. These considerations imply that we should not expect the ﬁrst-best scheme (which,
e.g., cannot have positive taxes on both consumption and labor income) to be observed in the
real-world. But this does not mean our model lacks real-world relevance.
We have shown that it is possible to improve on a pure consumption tax by taxing physical
capital income at a positive rate and labor income at a negative rate. This might appear to run
afoul of the real-world consideration that tax rates should be non-negative, but this problem can
be avoided as follows. We have noted that a pure consumption tax is equivalent to a cash-ﬂow tax
levied at the same rate on both physical and human capital, that is a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka tax.
Thus, one can start from some combination of a consumption tax and a modiﬁed Hall-Rabushka
tax, rather than a pure consumption tax, and it remains true that an improvement can be achieved
by increasing the tax rate on capital and reducing it on labor. The result, we argue, is a realistic
tax/subsidy system; one where consumption, labor and physical capital are all taxed, but capital
income is taxed more heavily than labor income. A further feature of this system is that subsidies to
both education and physical investment are provided, but while the education subsidy rate exceeds
the tax rate on labor income the subsidy rate to physical capital is less than the corresponding tax
rate. This concatenation of subsidy and tax rates appears representative, qualitatively, of what is
31found in the United States and a number of other countries.
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A. Derivation of the value function U0 and the growth rate t. From (2), (17), and (18),




t where h1 = [AH1
k 
q S1A(1)L(1)(1)]1=[1(1)] is
the human-physical capital ratio along the balanced steady-state growth path. Hence ln ht+1 =
[1  (1  )]lnh1 + (1  )lnht. Solve this diﬀerence equation:
lnht+j = [1  j(1  )j]lnh1 + j(1  )j lnht: (A.1)
From (2) and (17), we get Yt+1 = AL1h1
t+1Kt+1 = AL1h1
t+1kYt, or lnYt+1 = ln(AL1k) +
(1  )lnht+1 + lnYt which leads to
lnYt+j = j ln(AL1k) + (1  )
j X
i=1







(1  )  j+1(1  )j+1
1  (1  )
#
lnh1 +
(1  )  j+1(1  )j+1
1  (1  )
lnht;
by using (A.1).
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The remaining steps toward (20) for U0 are straight forward by setting t = 0 and using (A.2) in
the above equation.






. By (A.1), it is
easy to see ht = (h1)1t(1)t
(h0)t(1)t
. Substituting ht and h1 into t and taking logs provide
(21). 2






t(HtLt)1  Qt  Gt  Kt+1]
+ln(1  St  Lt) +  lnGt + t[AHQ
t (StHt)1  Ht+1]g; (A.3)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions are
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Solving the above equations gives the solution in (27)-(33).
In the case with inelastic leisure, the social planner’s problem given in (42) has the ﬁrst-order








The other ﬁrst-order conditions are the same as in the case with elastic leisure. The ﬁrst-order
conditions lead to the solution for (42). 2
















= [1  (1  )]: (A.14)
These equations and the solution for the agent’s problem lead to the optimal schemes in Proposition
4. Under the special scheme 
l = 0, 
k = 0, s
q = 0, s
k = 0 and 
c = , it is obvious that
1 + 
c = (1 + )(1  
y), and that 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g. Let Γc = (1 + )=f[1  (1  )]g
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Also, 1 + 
c = (1  
y)(1 + ) implies 
y = (  
c )=(1 + ). Then, 
g = =f[1  (1  )]g.
Since the consumption tax scheme in Propositions 2 and 3 is a special case here, the schemes in
Proposition 4 are not Pareto optimal (with higher leisure than in the social planner’s solution). 2
D. Proof of Proposition 6. Diﬀerentiating the welfare function with respect to the three tax
rates gives the ﬁrst-order conditions (36)-(38). Multiply both sides of (38) by (1k)=[(1)(1l)]
and substitute the resulting equation into (37):
c[1  (1  )]f[1  (1  )] + (1  )g =
(1  )(1  l) + (1  k)[1  (1  )]: (A.15)
By c = g in (36) and the fact that g + c + q + k = 1 where q and k are deﬁned in (16)
and (17), we have:
1 = (1 + )c +


1  (1  )

f(1  )(1  l) + (1  k)[1  (1  )]g: (A.16)
Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16) imply
1 = (1 + )c + cf[1  (1  )] + (1  )g;
35which yields 
c = 1=f[1(1)]g and hence 
g by noting that c = g. Substituting 
c back
into (A.15) gives the relation between 
k and 
l .
For the signs of 
l and 
k, substitute k = (1  )l=f[1  (1  )]g and c = 1=f[1 
(1  )]g into (38) and rearrange terms:


[1  (1  )]l










[ + (1  )(1  )]l
Λ1  (1  )(1  l)

; (A.17)
where Λ1  (1  )(1  l) = (1  )f(1  )(1  l) + (1  k)[1  (1  )]g > 0 for l < 1 and
k < 1. Note that l < 1 or k < 1 is obviously needed in any optimal tax scheme; otherwise
after-tax income from either labor or physical capital would be negative, and hence investment in
either human or physical capital would be negative according to (16) and (17) with zero subsidies.
Suppose l  0. Then the left-hand side of (A.17) is negative but the right-hand side of (A.17) is
positive. So 
l < 0 and consequently 
k > 0 according to their relation shown above.
Also note that c = 1=f[1  (1  )]g as proved above, and c = [Λ1  (1  )(1  l)]=f(1 +
c)[1(1)]g by both the deﬁnition of Λ1 and equation (15). These two expressions of c plus
the relation 
k = (1  )
l =f[1  (1  )]g imply that
1 + c =

1 + 
1  (1  )

f(1  )(1  
l ) + (1  




1  (1  )

[1  (1  )  (1  )(1  )
l ] > 1;
since 
l < 0. It follows that 
c > 0.
At the feasible solution (c;l;k) = (;0;0), we have g = c and
c =
(1  )[1  (1  )]
(1 + )[1  (1  )]
;
Λ1 = 1   + (1  )[1  (1  )]:




[1  (1  )]






(1  )[1  (1  )]
[1  (1  )]f1   + (1  )[1  (1  )]g
> 0:
Thus, the solution (c;l;k) = (;0;0) is not optimal. 2
E. Proof of Proposition 8. Note that the time allocation is independent of the taxes and is
already the ﬁrst best with inelastic leisure. For Pareto optimal taxation, equating output allocations
(c;g;q;k) to those of the social planner’s leads to (i) and (ii). More speciﬁcally, (q;k) is ﬁrst-
best if and only if (i) holds; c is ﬁrst-best if and only if (ii) holds. And g is ﬁrst-best under (i)
and (ii) because c + g + k + q = 1 in either the competitive solution or the social planner’s.
We can verify that the ﬁrst-best tax schemes also result when maximizing B by choice of the tax
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(1 + c)[1  (1  )]
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(1  )sq
(1  sq)[1  (1  )]
)
= 0: (A.22)
It is easy to verify that (i) and (ii) are the solution for the ﬁrst-order conditions. 2
F. Proof of Proposition 9. Let Bl  ln(1SL)+(1)(1)lnS+(1)[1(1)]lnL.
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; x = l;k;
with Λ1  (1)(1l)(2)+(1k)(1)[1(1)]. These conditions and the solution for the
agent’s problem give the optimal tax rates in Proposition 9. It can be easily veriﬁed that under these
optimal tax rates, the competitive solution is identical to the social planner’s. (The tax solution
in Proposition 9 can also be simply derived, without going through the ﬁrst-order conditions, by
choosing taxes/subsidies such that the competitive and the social planner’s solutions are the same.)
2
G. Proof of Proposition 10. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to c;sq and sk are the
same as (A.18)-(A.20) and the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to l;k and ˜ dkt are respectively
l : 
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; x = l;k; ˜ dkt
38with Λ2  (1  )(1  l)(2  ) + [(1  k)(1  ) + k(˜ dkt  ˜ dk(t+1))][1  (1  )]. Solving the
above ﬁrst-order conditions along with the solution for the agent’s problem gives the optimal tax
rates in Proposition 10. Again, under these optimal tax rates, the competitive solution is identical
to the social planner’s solution. 2
H. Proof of Proposition 11. By (21), higher L, S, k, or q means a higher growth rate. Since
all tax schemes in Propositions 9 and 10 are Pareto optimal, the result t9 = t10 is obvious. The
equality of t2;t3 and t4 comes from the fact that all the tax schemes in Propositions 2-4 give
the same values of q;k;L and S. The ﬁrst inequality ti < tj, for i = 2;3;4 and j = 9;10,
holds because, under Propositions 2-4, the values of q and k are the same as those in the socially
optimal solution but the values of L and S are smaller than their socially optimal values. The second
inequality t1 < ti, for i = 2;3;4, holds because, compared with the tax schemes in Propositions
2-4, the tax scheme in Proposition 1 leads to the same values of L and S, but smaller values of q
and k. 2
I. Proof of Proposition 12. The equality of U9 and U10 is due to the fact that all the tax schemes
in Propositions 9 and 10 are Pareto optimal. Since the tax schemes in Propositions 2-4 generate the
same equilibrium, they lead to the same welfare level. So we have U2 = U3 = U4. Now we need to
show that Ui < Uj, for i = 2;3;4 and j = 9;10. From the welfare measure B(c;k;l;sq;sk;dkt) in
Section 2, we can express the diﬀerence in welfare between the competitive equilibrium and social
optimum as
F()  Bcompetitive  Bsocial
= [1 + (1  )]ln
[1 + (1  )](1 + )
(1  ) + 1 + 
 (1  )ln(1 + ): (A.28)
When  = 0, it is obvious that F(0) = 0 and Ui = Uj, for i = 2;3;4 and j = 9;10. In other words,
the two solutions are the same and the optimal tax schemes in Propositions 2-4 are Pareto optimal
when there is no public good. It can also be easily shown that for all permissable  > 0 we have
@F=@ < 0. As a result, F < 0 if  > 0. That is, if there is a public good, then the optimal tax
schemes in Propositions 2-4 lead to a lower level of welfare than in the social planner’s solution,
39and thereby these optimal tax schemes in the competitive economy are the second best schemes.
The result U1 < Ui, for i = 2;3;4, is implied by the optimal tax schemes in Propositions 2-4. 2
J. The solution to the Ramsey problem. Agents optimize subject to (54). The ﬁrst-order
conditions are the same as (8)-(12). Solving these ﬁrst-order conditions and using the technology
and budget constraints, we have
St = S =
(1  )(1  )(1  l)
(1  )(1  l)(2  ) + [g + (1  k)(1  )][1  (1  )]
; (A.29)
Lt = L =
(1  )(1  l)[1  (1  )]
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B(c;k;l;sq;sk;g) + (1  ) lnh0 +
1
1  
lnK0 + B0; (A.36)
with B0 being a constant and
B(c;k;l;sq;sk;g) = lnc + (1  )lnq + [1  (1  )]lnk + ln(1  S  L)
+(1  )(1  )lnS + (1  )[1  (1  )]lnL;
where we redeﬁne  as   1=f(1  )[1  (1  )]g:
40Then the government’s optimization problem is to maximize B subject to
g = cc  sqq + l(1  ) + k  skk: (A.37)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the government’s optimization problem are
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; x = l;k;
with Λ3  (1)(1l)(2)+[g +(1k)(1)][1(1)]. The optimal solution is given
by (27)-(33) with  = 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions, (A.38)-(A.42), and the solution for the agent’s problem give the
optimal taxation in Proposition 13. 2
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44Table 1
Simulation results with income taxes only
Parameters:  = 0:1,  = 0:4,  = 0:3
Value of  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Variables (%)
l 12.2 17.7 21.1 23.5 25.5 27.1 28.7 29.9 29.9
k 64.2 47.2 34.7 23.8 13.4 2.5 -9.4 -23.1 -38.6
g 27.8 26.6 25.2 23.6 21.8 19.8 17.3 14.0 9.4
Table 2
Simulation results with income taxes and consumption taxes
Parameters:  = 0:1,  = 0:4,  = 0:3
Value of  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Variables (%)
c 125.0 99.9 85.4 74.8 66.2 58.8 52.4 46.9 42.6
l -93.8 -64.3 -47.3 -35.2 -25.7 -17.9 -11.4 -6.1 -2.2
k 24.0 18.3 15.1 12.8 10.9 9.1 7.2 5.1 2.7
g 27.5 26.4 25.2 23.9 22.5 20.8 18.8 16.0 11.4
45Table 3
Deviations from a tax mix by raising k and reducing l
Parameters:  = 0:1,  = 0:4,  = 0:3, and  = 0:5
Cases c (%) l (%) k (%) sk = sq (%) g (%) B=(1  )
Hall-Rabushka 0.0 28.57 28.57 28.57 22.47 11.20947
Consumption tax 40.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.47 11.20947
Tax mix 5.0 25.00 25.00 25.00 22.47 11.20947
Deviation 1 5.0 24.29 26.00 25.00 22.47 11.20219
Deviation 2 5.0 23.80 27.00 25.00 22.47 11.20069
Deviation 3 5.0 23.31 28.00 25.00 22.47 11.19935
Deviation 4 5.0 22.81 29.00 25.00 22.47 11.19817
Deviation 5 5.0 22.32 30.00 25.00 22.47 11.19716
Deviation 6 5.0 21.83 31.00 25.00 22.47 11.19632
Deviation 7 5.0 21.34 32.00 25.00 22.47 11.19565
Deviation 8 5.0 20.85 33.00 25.00 22.47 11.19515
Deviation 9 5.0 20.36 34.00 25.00 22.47 11.19483
Deviation 10 5.0 19.86 35.00 25.00 22.47 11.19468
Deviation 11 5.0 19.37 36.00 25.00 22.47 11.19472
46Table 4
The tax mix in G-7 countries, 1996
Tax Types
Total Taxes Personal Corporate Payroll Consumption Other
Income Income
(% of GDP)
Japan 28.4 5.7 4.7 9.3 4.4 4.3
U.S. 28.5 10.7 2.7 6.7 4.9 3.5
U.K. 36.0 9.3 3.8 6.1 12.7 4.2
Canada 36.8 13.9 3.3 5.9 9.2 4.6
Germany 38.1 9.4 1.4 14.5 10.6 2.1
Italy 43.2 10.8 4.0 13.1 11.2 4.0
France 45.7 6.4 1.7 18.1 12.5 6.9
OECD Av. 37.7 10.1 3.1 8.4 12.3 3.8
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1997. Revenue
Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-96. Paris: OECD.; United States. 1999,
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Oﬃce.
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